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GLD-218        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-2804 
 ___________ 
 
 JONATHAN RUIZ CASTRO, 
        Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
 T. R. SNIEZEK 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 3-10-cv-00458) 
 District Judge:  Honorable William J. Nealon  
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
June 23, 2011 
 
 Before:  AMBRO, CHAGARES and COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed  June 29, 2011) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
PER CURIAM 
 Jonathan Ruiz Castro, a prisoner incarcerated at the Federal Correctional 
Institution-Schuylkill located in Minersville, Pennsylvania, appeals from an order of the 
District Court denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  In his petition, Castro 
alleged that the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) miscalculated his sentence by failing to credit 
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him with time served in state custody prior to the imposition of his federal sentence.  For 
the following reasons, we will summarily affirm. 
I. 
 On December 12, 2005, Castro was arrested by Pennsylvania authorities on 
charges related to an assault and taken into state custody.  The next day, a federal detainer 
was lodged against him as a result of charges he was facing in the District of Puerto Rico 
for violating federal drug laws.  Castro was sentenced in state court on May 25, 2006, to 
11-and-a-half to 23 months of imprisonment for aggravated assault.   
 Castro was temporarily taken into federal custody on June 7, 2006, on a writ of 
habeas corpus ad prosequendum, and returned to state custody the same day.  On October 
5, 2006, he was paroled into federal custody so that he could address the pending federal 
charges.  He ultimately pled guilty to conspiracy to possess cocaine with the intent to 
distribute and was sentenced by the United States District Court for the District of Puerto 
Rico to a term of 90 months of imprisonment.   
The BOP calculated Castro’s federal sentence as commencing on June 13, 2007, 
the date that it was imposed, and gave him credit for the 250 days he spent in federal 
custody from October 6, 2006 – when he was paroled from state custody – until the date 
he was sentenced.
1
  Castro challenged that calculation by filing a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, in the United States District Court for the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania.  He alleged that the BOP miscalculated his sentence by 
                                                 
1
 Castro’s projected release date, accounting for good time credit, is April 19, 
2013. 
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failing to credit him with the time he spent in state custody from December 13, 2005, 
through October 5, 2006.
2
  The District Court denied Castro’s petition, concluding that he 
was not entitled to that credit because the time in question had already been credited 
toward his state sentence.  Castro timely appealed.
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II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction over Castro’s habeas petition pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 2241.
4
  See Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 242 (3d Cir. 
2005).  Our appellate jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the District 
Court’s denial of Castro’s habeas petition de novo, see Vega v. United States, 493 F.3d 
310, 314 (3d Cir. 2007), and may summarily affirm if no substantial question is presented 
by the appeal.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. 
We agree with the District Court that the BOP properly calculated Castro’s 
sentence.  The authority to calculate a federal sentence and provide credit for time served 
has been delegated to the Attorney General, who acts through the BOP.  United States v. 
Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 333-35 (1992).  In calculating a sentence, the BOP first determines 
when the sentence commenced and then determines whether the prisoner is entitled to 
                                                 
2
 On appeal, Castro suggests that he now seeks credit only for the period from 
December 13, 2005, through May 25, 2006. 
3
 We dismissed Castro’s appeal for failure to prosecute, but subsequently granted 
his motion to reopen the appeal and his motion to proceed in forma pauperis. 
4
 “Federal prisoners are ordinarily required to exhaust their administrative 
remedies before petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to § 2241.”  
Moscato v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 98 F.3d 757, 760 (3d Cir. 1996).  Castro 
contends that he has properly exhausted administrative remedies prior to filing his 
petition and, since the respondent does not dispute that contention, we will 
consider the issue waived and address the merits of Castro’s petition.  See 
Rodriguez v. Lamer, 60 F.3d 745, 747 (11th Cir. 1995). 
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any credits toward his sentence.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3585.  Section 3585(b), which governs 
when a prisoner receives credit for prior custody, expressly prohibits the BOP from 
crediting a federal sentence with time that has already been credited toward another 
sentence.  Id. (requiring credit for time served “that has not been credited against another 
sentence”); Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 337 (1992) (“Congress made clear [in § 3585(b)] that a 
defendant could not receive a double credit for his detention time.”).  Accordingly, since 
the time Castro served in state custody was credited toward his state sentence, he is not 
also entitled to credit that time toward his federal sentence. 
Despite the clear language of § 3585(b), Castro claims that he is entitled to 
additional credit toward his federal sentence on the theory that the federal detainer 
precluded him from obtaining bail on the state charges.  In support of that theory, Castro 
relies on several cases construing 18 U.S.C. § 3568, the predecessor to § 3585, to require 
that a prisoner serving a federal sentence receive credit for time spent in state custody 
“[i]f he was denied release on bail because [a] federal detainer was lodged against him.”  
Davis v. Att’y Gen., 425 F.2d 238, 240 (5th Cir. 1970); see, e.g., United States v. Haney, 
711 F.2d 113, 114 (8th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).  However, § 3568, which did not 
explicitly preclude double credit, has been superseded by the Sentencing Reform Act of 
1984 and recodified at § 3585(b), which clearly prohibits double credit.
5
  See Wilson, 
503 U.S. at 331-33.  Furthermore, even under § 3568, credit was not necessarily available 
for time spent in state custody on a federal detainer when that time had been credited 
                                                 
5
 The Sentencing Reform Act applies to offenses committed after November 1, 
1987.  Gallardo v. Quinlan, 874 F.2d 186, 188 (3d Cir. 1989) (per curiam). 
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toward another sentence.  See Rios v. Wiley, 201 F.3d 257, 273 n.14 (3d Cir. 2000), 
superseded on other grounds as stated in, United States v. Saintville, 218 F.3d. 246, 248-
49 (3d Cir. 2000); see also United States v. Dovalina, 711 F.2d 737, 740 (5th Cir. 1983).  
Castro’s arguments are therefore unavailing.   
We also agree with the District Court that Castro cannot invoke the limited 
exceptions to § 3585(b)’s prohibition against double credit pursuant to Kayfez v. Gasele, 
993 F.2d 1288 (7th Cir. 1993) and Willis v. United States, 438 F.2d 923 (5th Cir. 1971) 
(per curiam), because those cases require as a prerequisite that the state and federal 
sentences in question be concurrent.  See Rios, 201 F.3d at 272 n.13.   Here, Castro 
finished serving his state sentence before his federal sentence commenced, rendering the 
Kayfez and Willis line of cases inapplicable. 
Since Castro’s appeal does not present a substantial question for review, we will 
summarily affirm. 
